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I. INTRODUCTION
In this case, the court barred discovery into prior incidents of cars intruding into pedestrianonly areas or hitting pedestrians in Costco parking lots (except, impossibly, prior incidents that
were identical to Plaintiffs' incident as self-determined by Costco). But prior incidents and their
investigation by Costco is a critical source of notice to Costco that such incidents occur. Yet, the
court's improper discovery ruling foreclosed inquiry into relevant prior incidents. That error was
compounded by the court later ruling on summary judgment that Costco was not on notice of this
risk and could not foresee the particular circumstances of Plaintiff John Oswald, an innocent
customer, being hit and severely injured while in the Walkway, a designated pedestrian-only area
in the Boise Costco parking lot. In essence the court prohibited the discovery that would have led
to the evidence it later ruled was lacking.
Adding to these errors, the court also struck the proper opinions of two qualified experts
who showed that Costco designed and maintained the Walkway in a defective condition. And it
is undisputed that this defective condition - forcing elderly/disabled drivers with a known risk of
pedal error while parking to "take aim" with their cars at unprotected customers using the Walkway
- caused the Incident. Further, the court refused to consider evidence of Costco's actual notice of
available safety measures it could have used to protect its invitees, including Plaintiffs, from
vehicles encroaching into pedestrian-only areas like the Walkway.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 1

Each of the court's rulings is erroneous and Costco' s Reply Brief fails to present any
persuasive arguments justifying them. Instead, that brief, which is replete with misstatements of
the evidence, highlights the fatal flaws in those rulings. 1 Therefore, each ruling must be reversed.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

Costco's Argument on the Court's Discovery Ruling Misses the Point and Fails
to Address the Real Issue in Dispute

As discussed in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, the issue with the court's discovery ruling in
which it granted a blanket protective order to Costco was not merely that it struck proper discovery
requests but, more importantly, that it used that opportunity to significantly - and improperly narrow the scope of what it deemed to be relevant and discoverable information. (See Appellants'
Opening Brief ["AOB"], pp. 18-22.) In particular, the court limited discovery into prior vehicular
accidents and incursions into pedestrian-only areas to only those Costco maintained in a
centralized "risk management database"2 and that occurred in a similar location and under similar
circumstances as the Incident. (Tr., pp. 12-13 [23:12-25:2]; see R., p. 392.) Under the court's
erroneous ruling, the only relevant prior vehicular accidents/incursions were those that occurred

1

One of the many misstatements that Costco makes is that there is no evidence Myers experienced
pedal error during the Incident. (See Respondent's Reply Brief ["RB"], pp. 16, fn. 8, 31, fn. 16.)
Such a contention is directly contrary to the evidence. Indeed, the investigating police officer
herself confirmed Myers experienced pedal error. (E.g., R., p. 2116 [stating that, "[w]hile
attempting to park at Costco, [Myers] struck a parked vehicle, then hit gas instead of break (sic)
hard enough to drive over a parking curb and pin a pedestrian against another parked vehicle"].)
2
The court imposed this limitation even though Costco never proved it would be unduly
burdensome for it to locate or produce evidence of prior accidents that was not maintained in such
a database. (See R., pp. 52-127.) This alone was an abuse of discretion since such a showing is
mandated by law. Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616,622,338 P.3d 1220, 1226 (2014).
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in the ADA parking areas of Costco's parking lots, where the vehicle intruded into an adjacent
pedestrian walkway because the driver experienced pedal error. (Id.) Notably excluded from
discovery, therefore, was any evidence on prior vehicular accidents/incursions that, for example:
(1) involved an ADA driver who, due to pedal error or something else, intruded into a pedestrianonly area other than a walkway adjacent to an ADA parking stall; (2) involved a non-ADA driver
who, due to pedal error or something else, intruded into a pedestrian-only area; or (3) occurred at
other retail properties, even if it involved identical circumstances as the Incident and Costco had
actual knowledge of it. (Id.)
In its brief, Costco limits its arguments to only the propriety of the court's grant of the
protective order, and does not address the limitations the court contemporaneously imposed on
future discovery into prior vehicular accidents/incursions into pedestrian-only areas, thereby
leaving that issue unopposed. (See RB, pp. 13-17.) In addition, the arguments Costco does raise
fail to address the actual issue. Specifically, Costco' s arguments and the legal authority it relies
on to support those arguments address only the admissibility of evidence of prior accidents, not
the discoverability of such evidence. (See id. 3) But admission of the subject evidence is not at
issue, only its discoverability. (See AOB, pp. 18-22.) Moreover, the standard applicable to the

3

See also 2 Jones on Evidence§ 12:3 "Substantial similarity" (7th ed.) (addresses the admission,
not the discovery, of evidence of prior accidents); Sliman v. Aluminum Co. ofAm., 112 Idaho 277,
284, 731 P.2d 1267, 1274 (1986) (same); Cogswell v. CC. Anderson Stores Co., 68 Idaho 205,
215-18, 192 P.2d 383, 389-90 (1948) (same); Gorman v. Sacramento Cty., 92 Cal.App. 656, 664
(Cal. Ct. App. 1928) (same); Long v. John Breuner Co., 36 Cal.App. 630, 639-40 (Cal. Ct. App.
1918) (same); Armstrong v. Yakima Hotel Co., 135 P. 233, 234 (Wash. 1913) (same); Dist. of
Columbia v. Arms, 107 U.S. 519, 524-26 (1883) (same).
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admission versus the discovery of such evidence is not the same. Therefore, Costco's arguments
are irrelevant and provide no support to justify the court's improper ruling.
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1 ), "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense ...." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l).
To be relevant under Rule 26(b)(l), the information "need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id The
plain language of Rule 26(b)(1) confirms there is a difference between relevancy for purposes of
discovery and relevancy for purposes of admission. Id.; also compare I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l) with I.R.E.
401. Indeed, "[t]he standard for determining whether information is relevant for purposes of
pretrial discovery is substantially broader than the standard for relevance during trial." In re
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting 7 James Wm. Moore
et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 37.22[2][a] (3d ed. 2007)); also A.H ex rel. Hadjih v. Evenflo
Co., Inc., No. 10-cv-02435-MSK-KMT, 2011 WL 3684807, *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 23, 2011)
("[r]elevancy in the discovery context is broader than admissibility of evidence at trial"); US. v.
Ausbrook, No. 92-40064-01, 1993 WL 270506, *3 (D. Kan. June 4, 1993) ('"relevance' in civil
discovery is a much more encompassing standard than 'relevance' in the admissibility of
evidence .... "). 4 This is because the purpose of discovery "is to require the disclosure of all relevant

4

Although these cases discuss Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1 ), that rule is similar to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l). Compare F.R.C.P. 26(b)(l) with I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l). In
fact, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) is patterned after its federal counterpart. Sanders v.
Ayrhart, 89 Idaho 302,308,404 P.2d 589, 591-92 (1965). Thus, Idaho courts may look to authority
interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) to interpret Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(l). Westby, 157 Idaho at 622, 338 P.3d at 1227.
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information so that the ultimate resolution of disputed issues in any civil action may be based on
a full and accurate understanding of the true facts, and therefore embody a fair and just result."
A.H, 2011 WL 3684807 at *4; also Westby, 157 Idaho at 623, 338 P.3d at 1227 ("Rule 26 of the

Idaho rules, like its federal analogue, was designed to promote candor and fairness in the pre-trial
discovery process").
With respect to evidence of prior accidents, to be admissible the prior accidents must be
"substantially similar" to the accident at issue. Sliman, 112 Idaho at 284, 731 P.2d at 1274. But
even with the admission of such evidence, the '" substantial similarity' doctrine does not require
identical circumstances, and allows for some play in the joints depending on the scenario presented
and the desired use of the evidence." Jacquelyn v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., No. CV416-052,
2016 WL 6246798, *2 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2016); also Sliman, 112 Idaho at 284, 731 P.2d at 1274.
More specifically, "[w]hen the evidence is offered to demonstrate that a highly dangerous
condition existed, a high degree of substantial similarity would be required." A.H, 2011 WL
3684807 at *4. But, where the evidence is used only to show notice or awareness of a potential
defect, "[t]he requirement for substantial similarity is relaxed." Id.
Even more relaxed is the showing required for purposes of discovery into prior accidents,
which is the only purpose at issue here. For discovery purposes, the evidence need not be identical
or admissible and, as such, the party seeking the discovery "need not lay the same foundation of

substantial similarity as would be necessary to support admission into evidence." I.R.C.P.
26(b)(l);A.H, 2011 WL 3684807 at *4; Smith v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-106-BLW,
2010 WL 4641157, *1 (D. Idaho Nov. 5, 2010).
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Rather, all that is required is that "the

circumstances surrounding the other accidents ... are similar enough that discovery concerning
those incidents is reasonably calculated to lead to the uncovering of substantially similar
occurrences." A.H, 2011 WL 3684807 at *4; also Smith, 2010 WL 4641157 at *1 ("under Rule
26, evidence of similar accidents is discoverable even if not admissible so long as it is reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence").
Here, the discovery the court struck included discovery seeking information on vehicular
incursions into pedestrian-only areas that occurred at Costco' s warehouses or at other retail
properties "that [Costco was] aware of prior to the Incident." (R., pp. 115-27.) Costco maintains
this discovery was properly stricken because it was not substantially similar in that it was not
limited to incursions at the Boise warehouse or even to Costco' s warehouses worldwide, and
sought evidence on locations other than pedestrian walkways located between rows of ADA
parking stalls. (RB, pp. 13-17.) This was essentially the basis upon which the court struck the
subject discovery, although in ruling it further narrowed the scope of discoverable information to
only evidence on accidents/incursions caused by pedal error that was stored in a centralized
database. (Tr., pp. 12-13 [23:12-25:2]; see R., p. 392.) But this ruling, and Costco's argument
trying to justify it, run afoul of the legal authority discussed above, as well as additional authority
that confirms Plaintiffs were entitled to much more than the court permitted.
For example, as already noted, for purposes of discovery into prior accidents, all that is
required is that the circumstances "are similar enough that discovery concerning those incidents is
reasonably calculated to lead to the uncovering of substantially similar occurrences." A.H, 2011
WL 3684807 at *4; also Smith, 2010 WL 4641157 at *1. This is a lenient standard that embraces
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far more than the narrow parameters argued by Costco and the even more narrow parameters
adopted by the court. Indeed, vehicular accidents/incursions into designated pedestrian-only areas
at Costco' s warehouses, or even other retail properties of which Costco had actual knowledge, fall
squarely within the applicable "similar enough circumstances" discovery standard since that is
precisely the type of accident/incursion that occurred in this case. (E.g., R., pp. 15-27.)5 The fact

the vehicular accidents/incursions may not have occurred on a pedestrian walkway adjacent to an
ADA area or that they were not caused by an elderly/disabled man experiencing pedal error is of
no import because, to be discoverable (or even admissible), the accidents need not be identical to
the Incident. Smith, 2010 WL 4641157 at *1; also Sliman, 112 Idaho at 284, 731 P .2d at 1274.
Moreover, even if for admission purposes in this case, the term "substantially similar" is
narrowly defined to require that the prior vehicular accidents/incursions involved an ADA driver
experiencing pedal error and intruding into a pedestrian-only walkway adjacent to an ADA parking
area, discovery that more broadly seeks information on vehicular accidents/incursions that (1)
occurred in designated pedestrian-only areas; (2) involved an ADA driver; or (3) were caused by
pedal error - all of which the court's ruling barred - involves circumstances similar enough to the

5

See also Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Lewis, 911 S.W.2d 791, 793-95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (evidence
of similar accidents at defendant's other stores was relevant and provided a basis for verdict against
defendant); Grissett v. Circle K Corp. of Texas, 593 So.2d 291, 291-95 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992)
(evidence of similar accidents at defendant's other stores was relevant to foreseeability); Cohen v.
Schrider, 533 So.2d 859, 859-61 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988) (evidence of similar accidents at the "same
chain of stores" raised a jury question barring summary judgment); Dalmo Sales of Wheaton, Inc.
v. Steinberg, 43 Md.App. 659, 666-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (evidence of cars encroaching
on walkways of stores in the vicinity of the store at issue and damaging property was relevant to
the foreseeability of a car encroaching on the at-issue store's walkway and injuring a person).
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Incident that such discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the uncovering of the more narrow
class of "substantially similar" accidents. This is all that is required for discovery purposes.
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l); A.H, 2011 WL 3684807 at *4; Smith, 2010 WL 4641157 at *1.
Various cases confirm this fact. For example, in Smith, supra, the plaintiff was injured by
a defective ladder manufactured by Krause and sold by Home Depot. 2010 WL 4641157 at *1.
The plaintiff sought discovery on past incidents involving Krause ladders, to which Home Depot
objected. Id In particular, Home Depot argued the discovery was too broad and irrelevant because
Home Depot sold Krause ladders of different lengths and with different locking mechanisms, and
that each model's susceptibility to the specific defect at issue varied dramatically. Id The court
rejected Home Depot's position and held as follows:
[Home Depot's] arguments ... bear on whether the past claims are admissible, not
on whether they are discoverable.
The law on discovery concerning similar incidents relevant to a claim or defense
does not require that the similar incidents be identical to be relevant. The
Committee Notes on Rule 26 plainly suggest that incidents "of the same type, or
involving the same product" are discoverable under the rule. All the claims
included on the past claims spreadsheet involved folding Krause ladders with a
hinged release bar. (Citation omitted.) It is reasonable to believe that within this
group of claims is the possibility of a claim involving factual circumstances
identical to [plaintiffs] or claims with some identical characteristics - similar
claims that may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Id (Emphasis in original.)
Similarly, in Adams v. United States, a case that involved crop damage due to the windblown migration of the herbicide, Oust, the plaintiffs sought discovery from Dupont on prior
incidents involving Oust. No. CV-03-49-E-BLW, 2008 WL 162647, *1 (D. Idaho Jan. 16, 2008).
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Dupont objected, arguing the discovery: (1) did not seek information reasonably calculated to lead
to discoverable evidence because Dupont admitted it knew from its own testing that Oust moves
off-target; (2) raised the specter of mini-trials necessary to put each "similar incident" in context
during trial; and (3) sought information on past incidents that were so dissimilar as to not be
discoverable. Id at *1-2. As a compromise, Dupont offered to produce documents relating to
allegations of off-target movement of Oust by wind-blown soil onto any crop grown by the
plaintiffs that was at issue in the lawsuit. Id at *2.
The court rejected these objections and, with respect to Dupont's offer to produce the
limited information it felt was relevant to the plaintiffs' claims, the court ruled as follows:
Dupont offers to provide documents relating to allegations of off-target movement
of Oust by wind-blown soil onto any crop grown by plaintiffs and at issue in this
litigation. That offer is too limited. First, past incidents could lead to discoverable
evidence even if the crops are different than those at issue here. Second, methods
of migration other than wind-blown soil could be sufficiently similar to lead to
discoverable evidence.
Id. As this case and Smith, supra, confirm, discovery into prior incidents of the same general type,
even if they involve different products, circumstances or causes than those at issue in the case,
should be allowed since such discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence, i.e., substantially similar incidents. Id.; Smith, 2010 WL 4641157 at * 1.
In fact, evidence of prior accidents that involve different circumstances than the accident
at issue is not only discoverable, but admissible as well, even under the stricter admissibility
standard. For example, in Sliman, supra, the plaintiff suffered an eye injury when she was
preparing to open a bottle of 7-Up and the aluminum twist-off cap exploded from the bottle and
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struck her in the eye. 112 Idaho at 278, 731 P.2d at 1268. The plaintiff sued various companies
involved with the product, alleging they knew such blow-outs could occur but failed to warn of
that danger. Id. at 278-79, 731 P.2d at 1268-69. At trial, the plaintiff was allowed to admit into
evidence a list of 229 claims involving "blow-off' accidents that the defendant knew of prior to

the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 284, 731 P.2d at 1274. On appeal, the defendant argued the court
abused its discretion in admitting such evidence because "the prior accidents were so different
from the instant one .... " Id. This Court rejected the defendant's contention, ruling as follows:
As indicated in Fish Breeders, supra, the prior accidents only need be "substantially
similar" to the instant one, not identical in every detail. (Citations omitted.) The
listed prior accidents all involved the forcible ejection of 28 millimeter roll-on
aluminum caps, as in the instant accident. Most of the accidents involved injuries
to the eyes, as in the instant case. The precise causes of the blow-offs varied;
however, in the context of the plaintiffs' allegations of failure to warn, this variation
is of little consequence. Regardless of the cause of the blow-offs, the fact remains
that they did occur in the prior accidents just as in the instant accident. The
warnings and instructions necessitated by knowledge of this danger would be the
same. In short, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in
admitting the evidence of prior accidents. (Citation omitted.)
Id. (Emphasis added.)

Similarly, in Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., the plaintiff sued Costco after she was
injured at the Boise warehouse when an improperly stacked garden stepping stones display
partially collapsed and fell on her. 140 Idaho 416, 421-22, 95 P.3d 34, 39-40 (2004). During
discovery, Costco produced a report that listed over nine hundred other accidents involving falling
merchandise that had been rep011ed by Costco customers nationwide for a two year period. Id. at
422, 428, 95 P.3d at 40, 46. At trial, the plaintiffs expert relied on this report and testified that,
out of the hundreds of accidents contained therein, approximately one hundred of them were
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substantially similar to the accident at issue and, therefore, Costco knew or should have known
prior to the plaintiffs accident that it lacked adequate training for the proper and safe stacking of
store merchandise. Id. at 422,429, 95 P.3d at 40, 47.
After judgment was entered in the plaintiffs favor, Costco appealed, arguing in part that
the plaintiffs expert should not have been allowed to testify about the report because the accidents
contained therein were irrelevant since they were not limited to the type of accident alleged by the
plaintiff, i.e., an accident caused by improperly stacked merchandise, and, therefore, the expert's
opinion lacked foundation. Id. at 422, 428-29, 95 P.3d at 40, 46-47. This Court disagreed, holding
that the expert's reliance on the report and his corresponding opinion on the similarity of the
accidents and their role in providing Costco with notice were supported by a proper foundation.

Id. at 428-29, 95 P.3d at 46-7. While the accident report itself was not admitted into evidence, the
Vendelin case, like the previous ones, confirms that discovery into prior accidents of the same
general type should be allowed under Rule 26(b)(l), even if they involve different circumstances,
products and causes than the accident at issue.
As the foregoing authority confirms, Plaintiffs were entitled to conduct discovery into prior
vehicular accidents/incursions that was significantly broader than the court's extremely narrow
ruling allowed.

Indeed, Plaintiffs should have been permitted to obtain discovery on prior

vehicular accidents/incursions into designated pedestrian-only areas, even if the accidents did not
occur on a pedestrian walkway adjacent to ADA stalls, did not involve an ADA driver and were
not caused by pedal error, because such discovery is reasonably calculated to uncover evidence of
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other accidents that share elements with the Incident. A.H, 2011 WL 3684807 at *4; Smith, 2010
WL 4641157 at *1; Adams, 2008 WL 162647 at *1-2; I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l).
In fact, evidence of nothing more than vehicular accidents/incursions into pedestrian-only
areas at Costco' s warehouses or other retail properties of which Costco had notice is relevant,
discoverable and, arguably, admissible, because that is the identical type of accident involved in
the Incident. (E.g., R., pp. 15-27.) Also, it is only the general harm of vehicular encroachment
into a pedestrian-only area that need be foreseeable for purposes of Costco' s liability, not the
unique circumstances of the Incident. 6 Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 301, 796 P.2d
506, 510 (1990); Dalmo, 43 Md.App. at 672-73; also e.g., Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 393,
179 P.3d 352, 357 (Ct. App. 2008); Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673
(1999). As a result, if there is evidence of such prior accidents - which there undeniably is based
on Plaintiffs' own research, (R., pp. 1066-67, 1596-1625) - that evidence is relevant to prove
Costco' s notice of or the foreseeability of the risk of vehicular incursions into its pedestrian-only
areas, including the Walkway, the existence of a dangerous condition and whether Costco acted
reasonably to protect against the foreseeable risk through installation of appropriate safety barriers.

Sliman, 112 Idaho at 283, 731 P.2d at 1273. This is because such evidence shows: (1) the
foreseeability of vehicular incursions into designated pedestrian-only areas; (2) the cause( s) for

6

Costco claims this well-established foreseeability rule, which only requires that Costco foresee
"the general risk of harm ... , not the specific mechanism of injury," Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796
P.2d at 510, "completely ignores the 'substantial similarity' requirement," and that Plaintiffs failed
to explain how discovery into accidents that occurred in places other than an ADA parking area
assists them in proving their case. (RB, pp. 15-16.) This is inaccurate as evidenced by the analysis
in this brief, as well as in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief. (See Section II.A herein; AOB, pp. 18-22.)
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those incursions; (3) the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the safety measures utilized in the areas
in which the incursions occurred; (4) the dangers associated with a parking lot's configuration that
contributed to or allowed the incursion to occur; and (5) the need to alter that configuration or
incorporate effective safety measures to protect against the risks accompanying that configuration.
Despite the foregoing, the court, through its improper discovery ruling, barred Plaintiffs
from obtaining any of this evidence. Such a ruling was contrary to applicable law and an abuse of
discretion. Therefore, the ruling should be reversed and Plaintiffs should be permitted to conduct
discovery into prior accidents/incursions that is consistent with the authority discussed above.

B.

Costco's Argument on the Court's Striking of Plaintiffs' Experts is
Unsupported by, and Contrary to, the Law

In response to Costco's motion, in which it asked the court to strike the reports of Plaintiffs'
liability experts - Aleksander and Reiter - and bar them from testifying, the court ruled as follows:
Costco moves to strike the reports of Robert Reiter and Adam Aleksander, expert
witnesses for Oswald and Poore. Those reports contain opinions to the effect that
the accident Oswald suffered was foreseeable and that the design of the walkway
on which it occurred posed an "unacceptably high" risk to pedestrians. Opinions
to either effect are legal conclusions. As such, they are inadmissible. (Citation
omitted.) Even if opinions to either effect are somehow factual in nature, not mere
legal conclusions, they nevertheless are inadmissible because they "concern[]
conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts
utilizing the juror's common sense and normal experience." (Citations omitted.)
In other words, when laypeople are perfectly well equipped to assess the evidence
and draw their own conclusions, an expert's opinion about what conclusions should
be drawn is inadmissible. Costco's motion is granted to the extent Reiter and
Aleksander opine that the accident was foreseeable or that the walkway's design
was unacceptably risky. The Court need not determine whether their subsidiary
opinions also are inadmissible, as none prevents the entry of summary judgment on
the grounds described below. As a result, the motion is otherwise moot.
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(R., p. 2220.) This unreasoned and conclusory paragraph represents the court's entire ruling on
Costco' s motion to strike. (Id.) Because the court did not "reach[] its decision through an exercise
ofreason," it abused its discretion in issuing it. Westby, 157 Idaho at 621, 338 P.3d at 1225.
It abused its discretion in other respects as well. In particular, the court's ruling cannot

stand because ( 1) it was based on grounds the court raised sua sponte that Plaintiffs never knew
were at issue, let alone had the opportunity to address; and (2) the subject opinions do not constitute
improper legal conclusions, nor are they within the common knowledge of jurors. Costco argues
the contrary, claiming the court did not grant the motion on grounds raised sua sponte and that it
acted within its discretion under Idaho law in striking only "limited portions" of the experts'
reports because those portions were "blatant legal statements" or within the jury's common
knowledge. (RB, pp. 17-21.) The law holds otherwise.
1.

Contrary to Costco's Claims, the Court Ruled Sua Sponte and Such a
Ruling is Not Sanctioned Under Idaho Law

Two things are indisputable. First, Costco never moved to exclude the opinions at issue
on the grounds they were improper legal conclusions or within the common knowledge of jurors.
(See R., pp. 1312-33.) Second, the court granted Costco's motion on only those two bases. (R.,
p. 2220.) Despite this fact, Costco maintains that "[a]s an initial matter, this was not a sua sponte
ruling." (RB, p. 18.) To support this contention, Costco states that it "moved to strike Plaintiffs'
expert reports in their entirety, including on the grounds that portions constituted legal
conclusions .... " (Id) But the evidence to which Costco cites to support this contention - page
1330 of the record- confirms that it never moved to exclude any of the opinions the court struck
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on legal conclusion grounds. To the contrary, all Costco moved to exclude on legal conclusion
grounds were specific sentences in Reiter' s report on "the scope of Costco' s duty to pedestrians. " 7
(R., p. 1330.) That, however, is not what the court struck as improper legal conclusions. (R., p.
2220.) Instead, it struck opinions "to the effect that the accident Oswald suffered was foreseeable
and that the design of the walkway on which it occurred posed an 'unacceptably high' risk to
pedestrians. " 8 (Id) Thus, the court did, in fact, issue its ruling on grounds it raised sua sponte.
Notwithstanding this fact, Costco argues that the court's ruling "is exactly the kind of
discretionary evidentiary ruling Idaho law permits." (RB, p. 18.) Despite chastising Plaintiffs for
failing to cite to any "Idaho statute, court rule, or case stating that a court is precluded from striking
just a portion of a report," which is not even the issue on appeal, Costco likewise fails to cite to
any Idaho statute, court rule or case (or any other type of legal authority) holding a court is allowed
to base its ruling striking an expert's opinions on grounds it raises sua sponte, thereby leaving
Costco's position wholly unsupported. (See id. at pp. 18, 19.)

7

This referenced page confirms Costco did not object to any of Aleksander's opinions on legal
conclusion grounds and, similarly, that it did not object to any of Aleksander's or Reiter's opinions
on the grounds they were within the common knowledge of jurors. (R., p. 1330.)
8
It bears noting the court did not identify with any particularity the actual opinions it was striking
so as to enable the parties to know what, exactly, was excluded. (R., p. 2220.) While Plaintiffs
believe the court struck most, if not all, of their experts' opinions since the entirety of their reports
were devoted to analyzing the Incident's foreseeability and whether the Walkway was dangerous,
(see R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196, 1695-1715, 1718-21 ), Costco believes only "limited portions" of
the reports were excluded, with the "vast majority of Plaintiffs expert reports" being admitted.
(RB, pp. 17, 19.) If this is true, even more triable issues of material fact exist that precluded
summary judgment. (See Section 11.C, infra; also AOB, pp. 27-42.)
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Finally, Costco attempts to distinguish the legal authority Plaintiffs cited to in support of
their argument that the court's sua sponte expert ruling was an abuse of discretion. (Id.) While
the case law in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief does not deal specifically with the striking of expert
testimony on grounds raised sua sponte, this is a distinction without a difference. It is the
proposition for which those cases stand - that it is fundamentally unfair to rule upon an issue on
grounds raised sua sponte because it deprives the opposing party of notice and an opportunity to
be heard - that is important, not the procedural context within which the ruling was issued. See
Harger v. Teton Springs Golf & Casting, LLC, 145 Idaho 716, 719, 184 P.3d 841, 844 (2008)

(court cannot grant motion for new trial on grounds raised sua sponte unless it complies with Rule
59(d) [it does so within 14 days of judgment and after giving notice and an opportunity to be
heard]); First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Staufer, 112 Idaho 133, 141, 730 P.2d 1053, 1061 (Ct.
App. 1986) (notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard are fundamental to due process). For
these reasons, the court's sua sponte evidentiary ruling was an abuse of discretion.

2.

None of the Expert Opinions the Court Struck Were Improper Legal
Conclusions or Within the Jury's Common Knowledge

According to Costco, the court properly struck Reiter' s and Aleksander' s opinions on the
Incident's foreseeability and the "unacceptably high" risk the Walkway presented because such
opinions are legal conclusions or conclusions a lay juror can make based on his common
experience. 9 (RB., p. 19.) In particular, Costco claims that, because the determination of whether

9

It bears noting that Reiter never opined on the "unacceptably high" risk of the Walkway, (see R.,
pp. 1050-85, 1695-1715), and Aleksander's opinions on that topic simply state the results of his
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a duty exists is a question of law and foreseeability is evaluated in answering that question, any
opinions on foreseeability are necessarily legal conclusions. (Id. at pp. 19-20.) Additionally,
Costco maintains that, by testifying the "Walkway was dangerous," Reiter and Aleksander "t[old]
[the jury] what verdict to reach," a verdict the jury would be asked to make based on the facts
presented and that it was capable of making without expert testimony. (Id. at pp. 20-21.)
As with Costco' s prior arguments, these arguments miss the mark and fail to address the
analysis and legal authority Plaintiffs raised in their Opening Brief, all of which contradict
Costco' s position and establish that none of the opinions at issue should have been stricken.
Indeed, case law that Plaintiffs raised in their Opening Brief and that Costco completely ignores
in its own brief holds that expert opinions on the dangerousness of a defendant's parking lot and
the foreseeability of the accident at issue do not constitute improper legal conclusions. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bell, 30 F.Supp.3d 1085, 1103-04 (D. Kan. 2014) ("Bell"); also Storts

v. Hardee 's Food Sys., Inc., Nos. 98-3285, 98-3320, 210 F.3d 390, 2000 WL 358381, *13 (10th
Cir. Apr. 6, 2000) (unpublished) (expert opinions on the foreseeability of the conduct at issue and
the reasonableness of the defendant's actions are not legal conclusions); Christian v. Wal-Mart
Stores East, LP, No. 09CA014, 2010 WL 2621356, *3-4 (Ct. App. Ohio June 29, 2010) (error to

exclude expert opinion that pedestrian/motor vehicle collision was "reasonably foreseeable").
This makes sense because none of the expert opinions in those cases contained terms with
specialized meanings under the law, nor did they instruct the jury on the applicable law or give a

analysis using the different safety and risk analysis methodologies commonly used in the human
factors and safety engineering fields. (See R., pp. 1094-1108.)
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legal conclusion as to the defendant's ultimate liability, which is all that the ban against legal
opinions precludes. Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2008); Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 676, 694, 378 P.3d 464, 484 (2016); see also Bell, 30
F.Supp.3d at 1103-04; Storts, 2000 WL 358381 at *13; Christian, 2010 WL 2621356 at *3-4.
The same is true for Aleksander and Reiter. Through their opinions on the foreseeability of the
Incident and the dangerousness of the Walkway, neither used specialized terms, instructed the
jury on the law or gave an opinion on Costco's ultimate liability. (See R., pp. 1050-85, 10941196, 1695-1715, 1718-21.) And although their opinions that the Incident was foreseeable and
that the Walkway posed an "unacceptably high" risk to pedestrians support a finding that Costco
had notice of a potentially dangerous condition, that it failed to act reasonably to protect against
the risks associated with that dangerous condition and that said failure contributed to the Incident
and Plaintiffs' resulting injuries, neither Reiter nor Aleksander gave a single opinion that Costco
had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, that it breached a duty it owed to
Plaintiffs or that any such breach caused Plaintiffs' injuries. (See id.) As a result, consistent with
the authority discussed above, Reiter' s and Aleksander' s opinions on foreseeability and the
dangerousness of the Walkway are not improper legal conclusions.
Nor are the opinions within the common knowledge of jurors. The only argument Costco
raises to the contrary is the following two sentences:
[I]n this case, it would be improper for an expert to testify that the Walkway was
dangerous, since this is the type of decision a jury would be asked to make based
on the facts presented. As the District Court noted, this is the type of issue on which
"laypeople are perfectly well equipped to assess the evidence and draw their own
conclusions."
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(RB, pp. 20-21.) As is evident, Costco fails to address the various elements of Reiter's and

•
Aleksander' s opinions that were raised in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief that confirm their opinions far
exceed the common knowledge, experience and education of lay jurors. (Compare AOB, pp. 2627, with RB, pp. 20-21.) In particular, those opinions were based on a multitude of things
including: (1) each expert's specialized knowledge and experience in their respective fields of
human factors and engineering; (2) technical and scientific studies on the interaction of the human
and the environment while driving, the rate, causes, consequences and prevalence of pedal error
accidents in different human populations and driving environments, and the prevalence of
vehicular incursions into pedestrian-only areas; (3) different human factors and safety engineering
risk analysis models; and (4) the strength and appropriateness of available safety barriers. None
of this is within the common knowledge, experience or education of lay jurors and, therefore, the
court abused its discretion in striking Reiter' s and Aleksander' s opinions.

C.

Costco's Arguments on the Court's Erroneous Summary Judgment Ruling
Highlight the Errors in That Ruling

Two fundamental summary judgment rules are that: ( 1) the court must liberally construe
all facts and draw all reasonable inferences and conclusions in the non-moving party's favor; and
(2) summary judgment cannot be granted if there is any genuine issue of material fact. Fragnella
v. Petrovich, l 53 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P .3d 103, 108 (2012). In other words, "[s]ummary judgment

is not appropriate '[i]f the evidence is conflicting on material issues, or if reasonable minds could
reach different conclusions."' Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195,199,335 P.3d 40, 44 (2014). Not
)

only do Costco's arguments violate these sacrosanct rules, but so too does the court's summary
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judgment ruling. (See Sections II.C.2, 11.C.3, infra; see also AOB, pp. 30-42.) Indeed, both
Costco's arguments and the court's ruling not only fail to liberally construe the evidence and draw
all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, but they ultimately urge or grant summary judgment
despite the fact that genuine issues of material fact exist. (Id.) As such, both Costco' s arguments
in its brief and the court's summary judgment ruling are contrary to law and improper. (Id.)
Costco's brief is notable for other reasons. For example, it appears even Costco does not
agree with the court's grant of summary judgment on at least one of the grounds relied upon by
the court. In particular, according to the court, Costco was entitled to summary judgment because
a landowner never owes a duty to its invitees to protect them from accidents caused by out-ofcontrol vehicles because such accidents are not foreseeable as a matter of law. (See R., pp. 222939.) Even though Plaintiffs raised and analyzed the various flaws with this basis in their Opening
Brief, Costco ignores it entirely in its own brief and, instead, makes its own arguments as to why
the court's ruling should be affirmed. (Compare AOB, pp. 34-40, with RB, pp. 21-32.) Perhaps
Costco elected not to address this basis and Plaintiffs' analysis of it because it is indefensible for
the various reasons discussed in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief. Regardless, not only does that basis
fail, but so too do all of the grounds delineated by the court and Costco.
1.

The Court Granted Summary Judgment on an Element Both Costco
and the Court Concede Costco Never Challenged in Its Motion

Under long-standing precedent, a court commits reversible error if it grants summary
judgment on an element the moving party did not challenge. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc.,
126 Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994); also Sales, 157 Idaho at 201, 335 P.3d at 46 (a
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court "may not grant summary judgment on a ground raised sua sponte"). This makes sense in
light of the similarly well-established precedent governing summary judgment motions, under
which the party moving for summary judgment carries the initial burden of establishing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to each challenged element, and only if the moving
party meets that burden does the burden shift to the nonmovant to establish a triable issue of fact.
Id. A court eviscerates this law and the moving party's burden if it is allowed to grant summary

judgment on sua sponte grounds, a result Idaho law understandably forbids. Id
Here, both Costco and the court admit that the only elements of Plaintiffs' premises liability
claim (and other negligence-based claims) that Costco challenged on summary judgment were
breach and causation. 10 (R., pp. 818-24, 2190-91, 2222.) Implicit in this concession is a further
admission that Costco never challenged the duty element of any of Plaintiffs' negligence-based
claims, including the scope of any duty it owed Plaintiffs. (Id.) In fact, Costco emphatically and
repeatedly identified the duty it purportedly owed to Plaintiffs as a duty to "provide an accessible
parking area with an accessible path of travel" that complied with "the ADA and the Ada County
Code." (R., pp. 820-21; also R., p. 2190.) Based on that stated duty, Costco further argued that,

10

Costco claims Plaintiffs do not challenge the court's grant of summary judgment as to Plaintiffs'
II, V and VI causes of action for Negligence and Willful Wanton Conduct, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, respectively. (RB, p. 4, fn.
3.) Not true. As Plaintiffs made clear in their Opening Brief, the court's grant of summary
judgment as to these claims cannot stand for the same reasons its ruling on Plaintiffs' premises
liability claim cannot stand. (AOB, pp. 29, fn. 11, 30, fn. 12.) Thus, Plaintiffs are challenging the
court's dismissal of those claims. (Id.)
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because the Walkway complied with all applicable statutes, regulations and ordinances, it did not
breach that duty and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. (Id.)
The court expressly rejected Costco's breach argument, finding that Costco's compliance
with the ADA and the Ada County Code was insufficient to absolve it of a possible breach. (R.,
pp. 2222-23.) Since Costco's breach argument was limited exclusively to that one specific basis,
the court should have immediately ended its analysis since Costco' s argument failed to prove it
was entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw on the breach element. Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 271,
281 P.3d at 108; also I.R.C.P. 56(a). Instead, the court improperly proceeded to evaluate the scope
of Costco' s duty to Plaintiffs, an element Costco and the court concede Costco never challenged.
(R., pp. 2222-39; also R., pp. 818-24, 2190-91.) And, based on "other reasons" that the court, but

not Costco, raised, the court held Costco did not owe Plaintiffs a duty to alter the Walkway or warn
of its dangers. (Id.) This is a classic sua sponte ruling that is plainly prohibited under Idaho law.

Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531,887 P.2d at 1038; also Sales, 157 Idaho at 201,335 P.3d at 46.
Despite this fact, Costco argues the court's "decision was not a sua sponte ruling at all"
because it "argued that the accident was not foreseeable, there was no evidence of Costco' s actual
or constructive notice of a danger, and there was no requirement to place bollards around the
Walkway." (RB, p. 21.) Notably, Costco never raised the issue of actual or constructive notice of
a danger anywhere in its motion. (See R., pp. 818-33.) Similarly, Costco's argument as to the
Incident not being foreseeable and the installation of bollards not being required was never raised
in the context of challenging the duty element of Plaintiffs' premises liability claim (or any other
negligence-based claim). (See id.) Instead, these arguments were raised only in the context of
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whether Costco acted willfully and wantonly or whether it breached its duty of care to Plaintiffs.
(See id) Thus, the fact remains unchanged that Costco never challenged the duty element of any

of Plaintiffs' causes of action in its motion. (See id.; also R., p. 2222.) As a result, it failed to
meet its burden of proving that no genuine issues of fact existed as to the scope of its duty to
Plaintiffs, the burden never shifted to Plaintiffs to prove a triable issue of fact on that element and
the court's analysis and ruling on that element constitutes an improper sua sponte ruling. 11
Thomson, 126 Idaho at 531, 887 P.2d at 1038; also Sales, 157 Idaho at 201, 335 P.3d at 46.

2.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist as to Whether Costco Had Notice
the Walkway Was Dangerous or the Incident Was Foreseeable

According to the court, Costco owed no duty to Plaintiffs to redesign the Walkway or warn
of its dangers because there was no evidence of prior vehicular incursions onto it or onto walkways
at other Costco warehouses and, as such, Costco lacked notice the Walkway was dangerous. (R.,
pp. 2227-39.)

To reach this conclusion, the court analyzed the foreseeability of vehicular

incursions onto the Walkway. (Id.) But as discussed in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, foreseeability
is a quintessential question of fact to be decided by the jury that could not be decided by the court
in this case because a multitude of triable issues of material fact existed such that it was impossible
to say that "reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion." (See AOB, pp. 30-40.)

11

Costco implies that, because Plaintiffs in their opposition to Costco' s motion for summary
judgment corrected Costco's misstatement of the law as to its duty of care and discussed the
foreseeability of the Incident and Costco' s notice of a dangerous condition in the context of
opposing Plaintiffs' breach argument, the court's ruling on the duty element cannot be deemed a
sua sponte ruling. (See RB, pp. 21-22.) Tellingly, Costco fails to cite to any legal authority
supporting this contention or overruling Thomsen, supra, and other legal precedent establishing
the burdens applicable to summary judgment motions. (See id)
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Specifically, all of the following supports a finding that the Incident was foreseeable and
that Costco, in tum, had actual or constructive notice of the Walkway's dangerous condition and
a corresponding duty to Plaintiffs to protect them from, or warn them of, that condition:
•

Evidence of prior accidents involving ADA drivers that occurred in the ADA
parking/adjacent walkway areas at Costco warehouses, (R., p. 1199);

•

Evidence of prior accidents in Costco's parking lots involving ADA drivers in which
the driver experienced pedal error and injured or killed Costco invitees after
accelerating into a designated pedestrian-only area and/or hitting the invitees, (R., pp.
1066-67, 1596-1625);

•

Evidence the signposts and tire stops in front of the ADA stalls adjacent to the Walkway
were bent or dislodged toward the Walkway, indicating cars parking in those stalls were
failing to stop where indicated, with a resulting foreseeable risk those drivers were or
could encroach upon the Walkway and injure a customer, (R., pp., 1059, 1068, 1071,
1096, 1107, 1122-28, 1136, 1147, 1163, 1720);

•

Evidence of the documented physical and mental limitations of the drivers Costco knew
or should have known would be parking in the ADA stalls adjacent to the Walkway,
(R., pp. 1094-1196, 1718-21; also R., pp. 1764-2114);

•

Evidence of the various publicly-available studies, reports and other publications,
including a number of notices issued by the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"), that documented and discussed the prevalence of pedal
error accidents while parking, including the significantly increased rate of such
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accidents in the elderly/disabled population Costco knew or should have known would
be parking in the ADA stalls adjacent to the Walkway, (R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196,
1718-21; also R., pp. 1764-2114);
•

Evidence of the results from established risk analysis models that indicate the Walkway
presents a high degree of risk to pedestrians using it, (R., pp. 1094-1196, 1718-21 );

•

Evidence of the Walkway's design, including the fact that it is (1) sandwiched between
two rows of ADA parking stalls such that the drivers parking in those stalls "take aim"
at invitees using the Walkway, (2) flush with the adjacent parking lot and ADA stalls,
(3) narrow, and (4) not protected by any safety barriers even intended to, let alone
capable of, preventing vehicles from encroaching into the Walkway, (R., pp. 1050-85,
1094-1196, 1695-1715, 1718-21; also R., pp. 1764-2114); and

•

Evidence of Costco' s use of safety barriers, including bollards, at other warehouses to
protect designated pedestrian-only areas from vehicular incursions. 12 (R., pp. 1050-85,
1094-1196, 1718-21.)

Similar to what the court did in its ruling, Costco ignores some of this evidence, argues
other portions are inadmissible or fail to prove notice or foreseeability and tries to justify the
court's ruling on additional irrelevant grounds, including that there is no evidence of prior

12

If, as Costco claims, the court admitted "the vast majority" of Reiter's and Aleksander's reports
and struck only "very limited portions" containing "blatant legal statements that the accident was
foreseeable and the conclusion the Walkway was dangerous," (RB, pp. 17-21), all of the evidence
in these bullet points was admitted and should have been liberally construed in Plaintiffs' favor by
the court in ruling on Costco's motion. Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 271,281 P.3d at 108.
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accidents in, or incursions onto, the Walkway. (See RB, pp. 27-32; see also R., pp. 2214-45.)
Based on these grounds, Costco, like the court, claims the "something more" that was missing in
Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 Idaho 53, 423 P.3d 1005 (2018) and Gardner v. Harbor
Freight Tools USA, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-0019-EJL, 2019 WL 2236168 (D. Idaho May 22, 2019) is
also missing here because Plaintiffs' evidence proves only that "a car accident can sometimes
occur in a parking lot." (Id) Costco's arguments fail for the same reasons the court's ruling fails.
(See AOB, pp. 30-40.)
In particular, as analyzed in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, the "something more" required by
Johnson and Gardner is established here. (See id. at pp. 35-37.) Indeed, unlike Johnson and
Gardner, both of which involved only the general risk of a patron slipping or tripping on a transient
obstacle on a store's floor (e.g., liquid or a bunched floor mat), the instant case involves much
more than merely the general risk of cars hitting people in parking lots as the court and Costco
contend. (See id; see also RB, p. 31; R., pp. 2230.) Instead, this case involves Costco's creation
and maintenance of a permanent dangerous condition and that condition contributing to and
enabling the Incident. (See AOB, pp. 35-37.) As stated in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief:
[I]t is the Walkway's very design and existence that provides the "something more"
under Johnson. . . . Indeed, Costco elected to design and maintain the Walkway in
such a way that it funnels patrons onto it and into a gauntlet surrounded on two
sides by cars being driven straight at them by high-risk drivers known to be prone
to pedal error accidents without doing anything to protect them. And, consistent
with the Walkway's design, Plaintiffs used it as Costco intended and, while doing
so, the very things that make it dangerous occurred: Myers, an elderly, disabled
driver tried to park in an ADA stall and, while doing so, experienced the pedal error
such drivers are known to experience at elevated rates. (E.g., R., pp. 1050-85,
1094-1220, 1695-1715, 1718-21, 1764-2114.) Myers was able to injure Plaintiffs
only because Costco maintained the Walkway in the manner it did.
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(AOB, pp. 36-37, footnote omitted.) Thus, contrary to Costco's (and the court's) claim, the
"something more" under Johnson and Gardner is not missing.
Costco' s remaining arguments are similarly flawed. Specifically, Costco contends there is
no evidence it had notice the Walkway was dangerous because: (1) there is no evidence of prior
accidents in, or incursions onto, the Walkway; (2) there is no evidence it knew Myers would enter
the parking lot the day of the Incident or that he was a dangerous driver; (3) the evidence on prior
accidents at other Costco warehouses proves nothing because it is inadmissible hearsay and the
subject accidents are not substantially similar; (4) the articles in Reiter's work file (Exhibit Q) are
inadmissible hearsay and do not prove Costco had notice of anything "since there is no evidence
that relevant Costco employees ... were familiar with or had read the articles;" and (5) the evidence
that "bollards exist and are sometimes used in various settings" does not, without more, "translate
to notice that the Walkway was dangerous." (RB, pp. 27-31.) Each of these arguments will be
addressed in turn.
First, any absence of evidence of prior accidents in, or incursions onto, the Walkway does
not, as Costco claims, prove it lacked notice of the Walkway's dangerous condition or that the
Incident was unforeseeable. In fact, this Court long ago expressly rejected the notion that evidence
of prior accidents is necessary to prove foreseeability. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796 P.2d at 510;
also Parish v. L.M Daigle Oil Co., Inc., 742 So.2d 18, 24 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Springtree
Prop., Inc. v. Hammond, 692 So.2d 164, 168 (Fla. 1997)) ("The absence of a history of similar
accidents does not necessarily relieve a defendant business of a duty to erect bumpers, guardrails,
or warning signs"). Moreover, the evidence of bent sign posts and dislodged tire stops at the front

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 27

of the ADA parking stalls between which the Walkway was sandwiched provides evidence, or at
least a reasonable inference, that vehicular incursions onto the Walkway were foreseeable. (E.g.,
R., pp., 1059, 1068, 1071, 1096, 1107, 1122-28, 1136, 1147, 1163, 1720.) Indeed, such evidence
indicates cars attempting to park in the ADA stalls were failing to stop within the confines of the
stall, which raises the corresponding danger that they were encroaching, or foreseeably may
encroach, on the Walkway. (Id.)
According to Costco, evidence of the bent sign posts and dislodged tire stops fails to prove
any vehicles actually intruded onto the Walkway because ( 1) as the court pointed out, the evidence
merely indicates that "perhaps ... [the signs] ha[ve] been bumped by vehicles," and (2) Costco's
manager testified he had not seen a vehicle ever hit one of the sign posts or tire stops and, instead,
they were known to be hit by snow plows and other things. (RB, pp. 27-29; also R., p. 2227.)
Costco' s first argument ignores the fact that evidence of prior accidents/incursions is not necessary
to prove foreseeability, Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796 P .2d at 510, and also violates the rule that,
on summary judgment, all facts are to be liberally construed and all reasonable inferences are to
be drawn, in the nonmoving party's favor. Fragnella, 153 Idaho at 271, 281 P.3d at 108. As
outlined above, the bent sign posts and dislodged tire stops provide evidence, or at least a
reasonable inference, that incursions onto the Walkway are foreseeable. And this inference is
stronger based on the Costco manager's testimony that snow plows - large, heavy trucks -have
hit the sign posts. (RB, p. 28; R., p. 2126 [35:4-15].) If that is the case, it is foreseeable those
snow plows, or vehicles attempting to park in the ADA stalls, could encroach onto the Walkway
and injure a patron. The negative implications to Costco of this evidence is not minimized, and
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certainly is not neutralized entirely, simply because Costco's manager testified he had never
personally seen a passenger car hit one of the sign posts. Thus, Costco's argument on the lack of
evidence of prior accidents/incursions does not justify the court's ruling.
As for Costco' s claim that it could not have foreseen the Incident because there was no
evidence it knew Myers would enter the Property that day or that Myers posed a risk to people on
the Walkway, this argument misses the mark. To prove Costco' s negligence, Plaintiffs need not
prove that it knew that Myers, in particular, would shop at the Property on the day of the Incident
or that he was a dangerous driver. Rather, all Plaintiffs need to prove is that the Walkway, as
designed and maintained by Costco, was dangerous and that Costco failed to act reasonably to
protect its invitees from the foreseeable risk of vehicular incursions associated with it. Boots, 145
Idaho at 393, 179 P.3d at 357; Johnson, 164 Idaho at 56-57, 423 P.3d at 1009-10. Plaintiffs can
prove this in various ways, including through submission of the evidence outlined above since that
evidence establishes, inter alia, that (1) the elderly/disabled drivers, like Myers, that Costco knew
or should have known would be parking in the ADA stalls adjacent to the Walkway were prone to
pedal error accidents while parking; (2) pedal error accidents into designated pedestrian-only areas,
such as the Walkway, are common and often result in serious, if not fatal, injuries; and (3)
affordable and available safety measures can prevent such accidents. (See pp. 24-25, supra; see
also AOB, pp. 5-16.) Thus, contrary to Costco's unsupported claim, Costco's liability is not

dependent on evidence that it knew Myers in particular was a dangerous driver or that he would
enter the Property on the day in question and, as such, this argument fails.
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So too do Costco' s arguments regarding the prior accidents evidence, which Costco
concedes "relat[e] to accidents in Costco parking lots ...." (R., p. 2182.) Costco claims this
evidence, which consists of a legal opinion and media articles, does not prove it had notice that
the Walkway was dangerous or that the Incident was foreseeable because the evidence is
inadmissible hearsay. (RB, p. 29; see also R., pp. 1596-1625.) But Costco already lost this
argument and the court admitted the evidence for all purposes. (See R., p. 2221.) As such, it is a
part of the summary judgment record that must be considered in evaluating the court's ruling. And
this evidence, which involves prior pedal error accidents in Costco' s parking lots, provides proof
that (1) disabled/elderly drivers experience pedal error accidents; (2) such accidents have resulted
in the out-of-control cars intruding into Costco's designated pedestrian-only areas; (3) pedal error
accidents into pedestrian-only areas are foreseeable; (4) the safety barriers, if any, that were
installed in the violated pedestrian-only areas were insufficient to protect against the
encroachments; and (5) safety barriers intended to and capable of preventing vehicular incursions
into pedestrian-only areas are needed to protect the invitees therein. (See R., pp. 1066-67, 15961625.) All of this proves, or at the very least provides a reasonable inference, that Costco knew or
should have known that the Walkway was dangerous and that the Incident was foreseeable.
Costco contends, however, that none of the prior accidents are substantially similar and,
therefore, they cannot be used to prove notice or that the Walkway was dangerous. (RB, pp. 2930.) According to Costco, the prior accidents are not substantially similar because none of them
"occurred in walkways next to ADA parking spaces" and all of them occurred either as people
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were backing out of their parking spaces or when a vehicle crashed into a building. 13 (Id) Costco
misunderstands the substantial similarity standard. As discussed above, even for admissibility
purposes, that standard does not require identical circumstances. Jacquelyn, 2016 WL 6246798 at
*2; also Sliman, 112 Idaho at 284,731 P.2d at 1274 (evidence of prior incidents admitted even
though they were not identical to the incident at issue). Moreover, when the evidence is used to
show notice or awareness of a dangerous condition, "[t]he requirement for substantial similarity is
relaxed." A.H, 2011 WL 3684807 at *4. Here, the subject prior accidents meet the substantial
similarity standard because, like the Incident, they include elderly/disabled drivers experiencing
pedal error that resulted in them accelerating into designated pedestrian-only areas and/or injuring
or killing other Costco invitees. (R., pp. 1596-1625; see also R., pp. 1066-67.) Consequently,
Costco's claim that the evidence of prior accidents does not prove it had notice of the Walkway's
dangerous condition or that the Incident was foreseeable lacks merit.
Similarly meritless is Costco's argument that Reiter's file materials and, in particular, the
various published studies, reports and articles on elderly/disabled drivers being overly prone to
pedal error crashes while parking, the prevalence of pedal error crashes into pedestrian-only areas
and the affordable safety barriers available to prevent such accidents, are inadmissible and cannot
be used to prove notice. (See RB, pp. 30-31.) Indeed, the court admitted the subject materials for

13

Presumably the accidents Costco references in which the vehicle "crashed into a building" were
those where the pedal error event caused the out-of-control car to enter a designated pedestrianonly area such as an outdoor eating area or the warehouse's entryway or interior. (E.g., R., pp.
1596-1604, 1614, 1621-22.)

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 31

notice purposes. 14 (R., p. 2221.) Moreover, whether there was evidence of Costco's employees
having read any of the subject publications is irrelevant. Costco disagrees, arguing that under
LaFever v. A.H Hoffman, Inc., No. CV 04 311 S LMB, 2006 WL 1128227 (D. Idaho Apr. 26,

2006), Plaintiffs must prove that "relevant Costco employees ... were familiar with or had read the
articles" to prove notice of anything. (RB, p. 30.) Not so because LaFever is distinguishable.
In LaFever, which involved a fire that was allegedly caused by a cigarette that was put out
in the defendant's potting soil, the materials the plaintiff submitted in opposition to the defendant's
summary judgment motion consisted of newspaper articles about other fires being started by
people putting cigarettes out in potting soil that was not necessarily the defendant's product.
LaFever, 2006 WL 1128227 at *2-4. In granting the defendant's motion to strike the articles, the

court held they could not be used to prove notice because ( 1) there was no evidence the defendant's
employees had read the articles; (2) some of the articles were undated or dated after the fire at
issue and, thus, could not prove notice; (3) the court "ha[d] concerns about the accuracy and
reliability of the information contained in all of the articles;" and (4) there was no information on
what kind of potting soil products were the subject of the articles.

Id

These facts are

fundamentally different than the facts in the instant case.

14

The court should have also admitted Reiter's file materials for more than simply notice purposes
because, as pointed out by Plaintiffs, those materials, even if they qualify as hearsay, fall within
the market report and/or learned treatises, periodicals or pamphlets exception to the hearsay rule.
(R., pp. 2205-08.) Despite this fact, the court inexplicably and erroneously ruled that the materials
"won't be considered for their truth, even if some hearsay exception might apply." (R., p. 2221.)
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For example, unlike LaFever, the myriad publications in Reiter's file materials are not
mere newspaper articles, the accuracy and reliability of which is questionable. To the contrary,
the subject materials consist of studies, statistics, reports and articles that were published by
government agencies, including NHTSA, and other reputable companies in reliable publications
such as the Federal Register. (See R., pp. 1764-2114.) These publications are a far cry from the
unreliable materials at issue in LaFever. And, unlike the newspaper articles in LaFever, the
publications that make up Reiter' s file materials are more than sufficient to provide Costco with
actual, or at the very least constructive, notice of the Walkway's dangerous condition, the
foreseeability of the Incident and the safety measures available and necessary to protect against
vehicular incursions into the Walkway based on (I) the reliable and prominent sources of the
publications, i.e., NHTSA, insurance companies, ASTM International, and other reputable safetyrelated entities; and (2) the frequent and extensive nature of the publications. (See id.) Therefore,
contrary to Costco' s claim, Reiter' s file materials can and do provide evidence of notice to Costco.
Finally, Costco claims evidence of the availability of bollards and their use in parking lots
and alongside building entrances at stores, including Costco warehouses, "does not, without more,
translate to notice that the Walkway was dangerous." (RB, p. 31.) This contention is also
inaccurate. The evidence Plaintiffs presented on bollards included evidence that: (1) experts,
including Reiter and Aleksander, agree that bollards are critically important for ADA spaces
located directly in front of a building or a pedestrian-only area such as a sidewalk; (2) bollards can
protect pedestrians from vehicular incursions into pedestrian-only areas; (3) Costco and other
commercial retailers strategically place bollards in their parking lots to protect against vehicular
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incursions into pedestrian-only areas, including placing multiple bollards in the ADA parking
areas; (4) Costco installed bollards at the Property to protect things other than its customers; (5)
Costco failed to install bollards in the Walkway area; and (6) had Costco installed properly placed
bollards in the Walkway area, the Incident would not have occurred. (R., pp. 1050-85, 1094-1196,
1586, 1588, 1627-37, 1695-1715, 2133.) This evidence indicates not only that Costco knew there
was a risk of vehicular incursions into pedestrian-only areas, but also that it knew how to protect
against such a risk.

It also shows that, despite this knowledge, Costco inexplicably and

unreasonably refused to install bollards - or any other safety measure capable of protecting invitees
from encroaching vehicles - in the Walkway area. Such evidence is sufficient to prove Costco' s
liability or, at the very least, prevent the grant of summary judgment.
Based on the foregoing, it is beyond reproach that there were a litany of genuine issues of
material fact as to the existence of a dangerous condition, Costco' s notice of that condition, the
foreseeability of the Incident and whether Costco breached any duty to Plaintiffs that precluded
summary judgment. As a result, the court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous.

3.

Costco's Alternative Argument That the Court's Summary Judgment
Ruling Should Be Affirmed Because Plaintiffs Cannot Show Causation
is Fundamentally Flawed

According to Costco, even if the court's duty and/or breach analysis is erroneous, its ruling
should still be affirmed because the allegedly undisputed facts show Plaintiffs cannot prove
causation. (RB, pp. 32-34.) Costco's causation argument, both in its summary judgment motion
and its brief, is fundamentally flawed in that it relies on two bases that are not supported by the
evidence and, in fact, are directly contrary to it. (Id.; R., pp. 821-24, 1538-40.) In particular,
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Costco's causation argument is based on each of the following being accurate and undisputed: (1)
the opinion of Costco' s accident reconstruction expert, Torrey Roberts, as to Myers' car's path of
travel; and (2) that Plaintiffs' experts opined that bollards should have been placed only at the front
and center of the ADA parking stalls. (Id.) Neither of these is accurate, let alone undisputed as is
required for entry of summary judgment.
According to Roberts, Myers' car went entirely through the access aisle without ever
entering the empty ADA stall next to it or going over that stall's tire stop, after which it enters the
Walkway, hits Oswald, hits the Hine' s car on the opposite side of the Walkway and continues
forward until it goes over the tire stop in front of the Hine's parking stall and finally comes to rest.
(R., PP: 884-91; also R., p. 822.) To maintain this path of travel, Roberts repeatedly rejects the
notion that Myers' car went over any tire stops before hitting Oswald or the Hine's car. (Id.)
Roberts' opinion is glaringly defective. Indeed, the investigating police officer and three
eyewitnesses, including the Hines who were sitting in their car through the whole Incident, each
indicated that Myers' car did go over a tire stop before hitting Oswald or the Hine's car, thereby
suggesting Myers' car did not drive exclusively through the access aisle. (R., pp. 971 [14:10-22],
992 [6:10-8:2], 1007 [6:17-8:1], 2116.)

This evidence undermines Roberts' entire opinion,

including Myers' car's path of travel and whether bollards, even if placed only at the front and
center of the ADA stalls, would have prevented Myers' car from hitting and pinning Oswald.
Additionally, the Hine's car, which Myers struck from the front, was parked within an ADA space
and not in the striped access aisle. (R., pp. 976 [33:15-23], 977-78 [40:25-41:3].) As a result,
Myers' car must have entered the ADA space located directly across from the Hine's parking stall
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(as testified to by witnesses) in order to have pinned Oswald against the front of the Hine's car.
Therefore, because Roberts' opinion on Myers' car's path of travel raises triable issues of material
fact not only as to that alleged path of travel but also as to whether the Incident could have been
prevented through installation of the safety measures identified by Plaintiffs' experts, summary
judgment is inappropriate on this basis.
Moreover, even if one assumes that Roberts' path of travel is accurate, properly placed
bollards would have protected Oswald and other invitees using the Walkway from encroaching
vehicles and would have prevented the Incident in its entirety. (R., pp. 1050-76, 1103-08, 16951715.) Had bollards been placed at the front and center of each ADA parking stall and at the front
edges of the access aisle or even a bit within the lines of the access aisle as is customary with other
national retailers, Myers' car could not have intruded into the Walkway. (Id.) According to
Roberts, the access aisle through which Myers purportedly drove is six feet wide. (R., p. 875.)
Thus, if bollards were placed at the front of that access aisle even with the two edge lines (resulting
in a six foot gap between bollards), or even slightly inside the edge lines so the resulting gap was
only five feet, the Incident would have been prevented in its entirety because Myers' car (and the
vast majority of other cars) could not fit through that gap, and the bollard would have stopped
Myers' car even if the car hit the bollard head-on. (Id.; also R., pp. 1050-76, 1103-08, 1695-1715.)
And placing bollards in these positions would comply with both the ADA and the Ada County
Code because they would still provide at least 60" of clearance.

(R., pp. 916-17, 1701.)

Consequently, contrary to Costco's argument, properly placed bollards would have prevented the
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Incident and, thus, Plaintiffs can prove causation or, at the very least, that genuine issues of
material fact exist that preclude summary judgment.
Finally, with respect to the other safety measures identified by Plaintiffs' experts, including
a wider or raised Walkway and/or higher tire stops, Costco argued at the summary judgment stage
and reasserts that argument here, that none of these measures would have prevented the Incident
in its entirety and, therefore, causation cannot be shown. (R., pp. 823-24; RB, pp. 33-34.) Neither
of Plaintiffs' experts opined that any of these measures would have prevented the Incident
altogether; rather, Reiter opined that their absence rendered the Walkway dangerous and less safe
than walkways in other Costco parking lots. (R., pp. 1060-61.) He also opined that their use could
have prevented the Incident or, at the very least, prevented Oswald from being pinned, thereby
decreasing the severity of his injuries, because such safety measures slow vehicles down, provide
better visibility to pedestrians and increase the time that drivers and pedestrians can react should a
car begin to encroach upon the Walkway. (Id.) Costco never addressed this portion of Reiter' s
opinion in its summary judgment motion, nor does it on appeal, and, instead argues only that these
safety measures could not have prevented the Incident in its entirety. (R., pp. 811-34; RB, pp. 3234.) Absolute prevention of the Incident, however, is not the standard. Rather, the standard is
whether Costco maintained the Walkway in a "reasonably safe condition," whether it exercised
"ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of hann" to its invitees and whether there
is a "causal connection between [Costco's] conduct and [Plaintiffs'] resulting injmy." Boots, 145
Idaho at 392-93, 179 P.3d at 355-56. Therefore, as shown above, various triable issues of material
fact exist as to Costco's causation argument that prohibit summary judgment on this issue.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 37

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein and in Plaintiffs Opening Brief, Plaintiffs respectfully
request this Court reverse the court's rulings and remand the case with an order that the court (1)
allow discovery into prior vehicular accidents and incursions at Costco' s warehouses; (2) deny
Costco's motion to strike Plaintiffs' experts; and (3) deny Costco's motion for summary judgment.
Dated this 10th day of February, 2020.
ANDERSEN SCHWARTZMAN
WOODARD DEMPSEY, PLLC

Christine R. Arnold
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